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More than ten years after the financial crisis, the challenges of
European banking and of the eurozone highlight that the existence
of a European commonmarket in banking is at best partial. Examining
how British and French commercial banks and banking associations
responded to the plans for a European common market in banking
between 1977 and 1992, this article contributes to explaining this
partial character, and highlights that this project was primarily polit-
ical. This challenges thewidely held view that large companies tended
to push for more integration. This article shows that until the
mid-1980s, the banking sector was not necessarily calling for
European financial integration in the form of a common market in
banking for at least three reasons: they doubted the usefulness of such
a move, they feared an increase in regulation, and I meant that banks
focused more on domestic or global matters than on European ones.
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Introduction
More than ten years after the financial crisis, there is still much discus-
sion about the challenges of European banking, such as the fragility of
some large commercial banks, and the so-called doom loop between
banks and sovereigns.1 These challenges show not only that the bank-
ing sector and the functioning of the eurozone are closely intertwined,
but also that the national level still matters in Europe. In 2020, the
European market is still fragmented, while at the same time banking
is a very global industry organized around major financial centers.
However, a “common market” in banking was supposed to be in place
since 1992, as a result of the ambitious plans designed by the European
Commission (the Commission) chaired by Jacques Delors in the
mid-1980s to relaunch European integration. Moreover, today’s post-
Brexit concerns of the British financial industry about the risk of losing
its passporting rights, allowing firms to conduct business in the
European Economic Area without further authorization from each
country, show the at least partial reality of this common financial
market. Studying how commercial banks viewed the construction of
this common market in banking in the 1970s and 1980s enables us to
understand better what banks valued in this project, but also to high-
light its partial dimension and the fact that this project was primarily
political. This challenges the view that large companies tended to push
for more integration.
The idea of a commonmarket in banking in Europe is relatively old.
The idea derives from the broader notion of a commonmarket as set out
in the 1957 Treaty of Rome establishing the European Economic
Community (EEC or Community). The aim of the common market was
to reproduce at the European level the same conditions as in a national
market.2 A commonmarket in bankingmeant an environment inwhich
banks could freely establish and provide services in the entire Commu-
nity area, with comparable competitive conditions. The plans to estab-
lish a common market in banking, first designed in the mid-1960s,
revealed serious challenges. Banking legislations and banking systems
were very different, within the Community and elsewhere, andwere an
integral part of monetary policies at the core of states’ sovereignty.3 For
commercial banks, by the late 1970s, European affairs attracted at best
indifference, sometimes distrust. A little bitmore than a decade later, in
the late 1980s and early 1990s, the situation had completely reversed,
1. See for instance: Epstein, Banking on Markets, 36.
2. Bank of France Archives (BFA), 1357200901/93, “Le Marché Commun
bancaire,” Charles Campet, Revue du Marché Commun n°137, pp. 441–446.
3. See for instance: Monnet, Controlling Credit.
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andbigcommercial banksweredevisingambitiousplans foradapting to
the “horizon 1992” environment. The advent of a common market in
banking was the result of work spanning from the late 1970s to the late
1980s, to which commercial banks, first reluctantly and then more
enthusiastically, had been closely associated. The eventual result was
notquitewhatwashopedbyEuropeanpolicymakers, however, because
national structures remained prominent in European banking markets.
Part of the literature has stressed the driving role of companies in
the progress of European integration.4 Some multinationals such as
Unilever5 or Fiat,6 and some transnational business networks such as
the European League of Economic Cooperation or the European Round
Table of Industrialists, have been described as active supporters of
European integration.7 This article takes a different view and shows
that the banking sector was not necessarily calling for European finan-
cial integration in the form of a common market in banking, partly
because in the 1970s, their international interests focused elsewhere
rather than on Europe.
In addition, historical studies of European integration have shown
the involvement of multinationals since the beginning of European
integration for a long time, but industry has received much more atten-
tion than banking.8 Several studies have analyzed the responses to
European integration from the perspective of specific sectors9 of a par-
ticular country’s business sector as a whole,10 of competition policy,11
or of transnational networks of multinationals.12 However, little has
been done on the world of banking, particularly for the late 1970s to
1980s era, despite this period being crucial in the relaunch of the inte-
gration process.13 Furthermore, in European studies and European
integration historiography in general, state-centered approaches pre-
vail in the literature. Existing studies of the commonmarket in banking
andof theEuropean financial singlemarket, asmuchof the literature on
4. Sandholtz and Zysman, “1992,” 117–118; Cowles, “Setting the Agenda”;
Collignon and Schwarzer, Private Sector Involvement in the Euro; Jones andMiskell,
“European Integration and Corporate Restructuring.”
5. Jones and Miskell, “European Integration and Corporate Restructuring.”
6. Ramírez Pérez, “Transnational Business Networks.”
7. Ramírez Pérez, “Crises and Transformations of European Integration.”
8. Dumoulin, Girault, and Trausch, L’Europe du patronat.
9. Bussière, Dumoulin, and Schirmann, Milieux économiques et intégration
européenne; Ramírez Pérez, “Multinational Corporations and European Integra-
tion.”
10. Rollings, British Business.
11. Rollings and Warlouzet, “Business History and European Integration.”
12. Rollings and Kipping, “Private Transnational Governance.”
13. On the role of bankers on the beginnings of European integration, see Fer-
guson, “Siegmund Warburg.”
British and French Commercial Banks and the Common Market 3
https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/eso.2020.20
Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. IP address: 92.3.124.202, on 24 Aug 2020 at 08:28:55, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at
the history of banking regulation, focus on the perspective of the public
authorities,14 or on the changes induced by European integration on
“policy networks” in the financial sector.15 Looking at commercial
banks, and at business associations such as the British Bankers’ Asso-
ciation (BBA), the Association Française des Banques (French Banks’
Association, AFB), or the European Banking Federation (EBF or the
Federation), this article sheds light on the critics, limits, and shortcom-
ings the banking sector formulated about the Commission’s plans.
France and the United Kingdom both had an important banking
system, but different profiles. The United Kingdom hosted one of the
biggest financial centers in the world, was a late comer to the European
Economic Community, and did not join the future Economic andMon-
etary Union. France, on the other hand, had an important, even if
smaller, banking sector and a strong tradition of state intervention.
Besides, its leading banks and, from 1982, its entire banking system
were state-owned. Finally, France eventually joined the monetary
union. Taking into account these two countries helps to understand
better the respective role of national contexts and sectoral processes
and avoid “exceptionalist” perspectives. Although international bank-
ing practices and strategies influenced how each individual firm posi-
tioned itself toward a possible European common market in banking,
this article primarily focuses on banks’ collective political position
through the responses of business associations and federations (the
European Banking Federation, the British Bankers’ Association, the
FrenchBanks’Association) andmajor French andBritish banks. There-
fore, this article focusesmore on politics than on commercial practices,
although both dimensions influenced each other.
Based on a variety of French, British, and European Union archival
sources, including the records of the British Bankers’ Association and
of multiple commercial banks from both countries, this article exam-
ines how banks responded to the plans for a common market in bank-
ing. After a few preliminary remarks on the first initiatives of the
EuropeanCommission in the 1960s and early 1970s, this article focuses
on the period between the first banking directive in 1977, which repre-
sented the real starting point of the establishment of a common market
in banking, and 1992, the official datewhen itwas claimed the common
market in banking would be completed. It shows that French and
British commercial banks, although they favored European integration
14. Farges-Cazenove, “Construire LeMarchéBancaire Européen.”Onhistorical
perspectives on international banking regulation, see Goodhart, The Basel Commit-
tee on Banking Supervision; Schenk, “Summer in the City”; Mourlon-Druol, “‘Trust
Is Good.’” On the European dimension, see Mourlon-Druol, “Banking Union”;
Drach, “Globalization Laboratory.”
15. Josselin, Money Politics.
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in general, were initially less supportive of European financial and
banking integration in the form of a common market in banking for at
least three reasons: They doubted the usefulness of such a move; they
feared an increase in regulation; and their focus and business activities
were domestic or global rather than European. They thus had a some-
what different perspective than the industrial sector, described in the
literature as more supportive of integration. In some instances, they
fiercely opposed the Commission’s plans. In the French case, banks
tended to see the common market as a threat to their own position in
their domestic market. However, British and French banks changed
their minds in the mid-1980s and became more enthusiastic about
it. The proposed regulations of the Commission had themselves chan-
ged and now coincided more closely with several recommendations
formulated earlier by the European Banking Federation or by national
associations. In addition, the political lead induced at the Commission
level by Delors and Cockfield, the commissioner for internal market and
former British Secretary of Trade in Thatcher’s government who drafted
the white paper, created a new impetus. It was somehowmore favorable
to banks but also more difficult to oppose for them, as it went in hand in
hand with more liberal-oriented economic policies adopted at the
national level and emerging new standards at the global level, including
theUnited States. Finally, the changes happening at the same time in the
financial sector, with the aftermath of the international debt crisis and
securitization underway, pushed banks to see European opportunities
more positively. Overall, the persistence of national patterns, and the
absence of a full-fledged European-wide regulatory and supervisory
framework, prevented the emergence of a genuine common market in
banking, but the European level became an intermediary strategic play-
ing field for large banks, between national and global markets.
From Distrust to Interest
The first step toward a common market in banking was taken in 1965,
when the Commission undertook a study of banking legislation in EEC
countries with a view to harmonization.16 The realization of a common
market in banking implied harmonizing the rules governing the access
to the activity of banking, and suppressing the obstacles to the freedom
16. Bank of England Archives (BEA), 8 A48/10, “Note the European Conserva-
tiveGroup in the EuropeanParliament in connectionwith initial consideration of the
E.E.C commission's proposal for a council directive on the co-ordination of laws,
regulations & administrative provisions governing the commencement and carrying
on of the business of credit institutions by the European Parliament's economic &
monetary affairs committee in Brussels on 6th & 7th February, 1975.”
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to establish and to provide services in the Community. A first directive
issued in 1973, after eight years of work by the Commission, entailed
the principles of freedom to provide services and the freedom of estab-
lishment. For the Commission, it was the first step in the establishment
of a common market in banking. In practice, it was of minimal impact
because of restrictions of capital movements and the absence of
harmonization between banking legislations.17 However, it revealed
the complex relationship between harmonization and liberalization
in the construction of a common market in banking, which would be
discussed all along in the 1980s. For instance, even if the freedom to
establishwas fully liberalized, aGerman bankwilling to set up a branch
in Italy would probably have a regional authorization only, whereas an
Italian bank opening a branch in Germany could operate in the entire
German territory.18 Freedom of establishment could thus create com-
petition issues and therefore called for coordination between banking
legislations. This lack of coordination is also a reason why the 1973
directive had little impact and triggered little reaction from banks, even
though they had been involved in its drafting through the European
Banking Federation.19
There was thus a harmonization dimension and a liberalization
dimension to the common market in banking. Harmonization
meant some degree of convergence between banking legislations.
Liberalization meant the suppression of restrictions to the establish-
ment or the provision of services in the Community, which could take
many forms, from restrictions based on nationality to special require-
ments for foreign banks or controls on capital movements. Originally,
harmonization was considered as a stage toward the unification of
banking legislations in the EEC, as explained by Charles Campet, in
charge of the banking division at the European Commission in 1974.20
17. BFA, Journal Banque n°327, “La libération de l’activité bancaire dans la
Communauté Économique Européenne. La directive du 28 juin 1973,” Charles
Campet, March 1974; BFA, 1749200912/266, H. Muller, “A Legal Framework for
International Supervision: The EECModel,” in Bank Administration Institute Issues
inBankRegulation 8, no. 1 (Summer 1984), “TheRole of International Supervision in
Banking,” 36–42.
18. BFA, Journal Banque n°327, “La libération de l’activité bancaire dans la
Communauté Économique Européenne. La directive du 28 juin 1973,” Charles
Campet, March 1974, p. 263.
19. London Metropolitan Archives (LMA), British Bankers’ Association (BBA)
documents, M 32020, Briefing Note, “Directive on Freedom of Establishment and
Freedom to Supply Services for Banks and Other Financial Institutions,” June 1982;
BFA, 1357200901/97, “Compte rendude la réuniond’information avec la Fédération
bancaire de la C.E.E. (Bruxelles, 5 mars 1970).”
20. BFA, Journal Banque n°327, “La libération de l’activité bancaire dans la
Communauté Économique Européenne. La directive du 28 juin 1973,” Charles
Campet, March 1974.
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The Commission conceived harmonization as a necessary complement
to the suppression of restrictions to free banking in the EEC. In the
context of widely heterogeneous banking legislations in the EEC, the
suppression of restrictions could create distortion of competitive con-
ditions, in particular because of the multiplicity of legislations to com-
ply for banks. These measures were enacted through directives, which
were legally binding regulations requiring member states to transpose
them in their national regulatory framework. However, harmonization
proved much more difficult to achieve than was originally hoped for
by the Commission. In particular, the British banks and government
considered that if their system, traditionally informally regulated,
was to be harmonized with that of the continent, that would amount
to an increase of regulation and would undermine the attractiveness of
London as an international financial center. As will be explained in the
next pages, the Commission shifted its overall regulation philosophy
from the 1970s to the 1980s, from an ambitious harmonization program
(failed first banking directive proposal), to a more gradual harmoniza-
tion approach (first banking directive), and finally to an approach based
on mutual recognition (second banking directive).
For commercial banks, a commonmarket in banking was not a clear
and exciting idea, andmanyof themwere losing their interest in Europe
during the 1970s. In 1970, during ameeting between delegates from the
EBF and the European Commission, Paul Fabre, from the Association
Française des Banques, asked what exactly did a common market in
banking mean, and he was skeptical about the need for harmoniza-
tion.21 He stated that banks could already establish in other European
Economic Community countries if they wanted. In the early 1970s,
European activities of big commercial banks concentrated on the set-
ting up of banking clubs, a kind of flexible, cooperative arrangement
between a few chosen partners. As these clubs were limiting competi-
tion between their members, they were somehow at odds with the idea
of a common market in banking, which, on the contrary, aimed at
enabling banks to freely compete on the EEC countries’markets.22 Even
the Commission’s officials, such asMarcel Campet, recognized that the
1973 directive was esoteric and included subtleties of extraordinary
sophistication.23 British banks followed European affairs more closely
than French banks, but this was so because they were distrustful of
European institutions and its style of regulation. In 1979, an internal
21. BFA, 1357200901/97, “Compte rendu de la réunion d’information avec la
Fédération bancaire de la C.E.E. (Bruxelles, 5 mars 1970).”
22. Ross, “European Banking Clubs in the 1960s.”
23. BFA, Journal Banque n°327, “La libération de l’activité bancaire dans la
Communauté Économique Européenne. La directive du 28 juin 1973,” Charles
Campet, March 1974, p. 261.
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note at Société Générale mocked the “administrative machine of the
EEC” and its wish to pursue international business conferences in
which European banking clubs had been involved in 1977 and
1979.24 The European banking club of the Société Générale and Mid-
land Bank, European Banks' International Company (EBIC), decided in
June 1979 to limit as much as possible its involvement in European
Economic Community initiatives.25 In 1980, EBIC was relating its own
disappointing results and history to the lack of progress in European
affairs compared to the 1960s: “The probability that the political, eco-
nomic and monetary conditions, necessary to create a large European
unit, would be fulfilled, receded ever further beyond the horizon,while
at the same time a genuine desire for such a unit had disappeared from
the minds of our banks' top management.”26
At the turn of the 1980s, the idea of a commonmarket still left banks
very skeptical. However, most important, their international activity
centered more on lending to developing countries through the Euro-
dollar market: Their international concerns were more global than
European.27 An international financial center such as London, more
than a possible regulatory place such as Brussels, attracted the banks’
attention.28
The 1977 first banking directive was a response to the initial
challenges posed by the 1973 liberalization directive and intended to
harmonize the conditions for conducting banking activities in Europe.
Its first draft had been fiercely opposed by the British Bankers’
Association, who did not want to change their informally regulated
banking system.29 Besides, the economic and monetary crisis in
1973–1974 hampered European efforts toward convergence of banking
legislations.30 The directive eventually issued was therefore of modest
importance. For the French, it implied almost no change at all in the
already existing legislation, partly because they already had the licens-
ing requirements that the directive was rendering mandatory, and
partly because theywere already used to a formally regulated system.31
For the British, the introduction of a licensing system was the only
24. Société Générale Archives (SGA), 81475, Comments on memorandum of
Paul Verhagen by J.-M. Weydert, 8 June 1979.
25. SGA, 81475, Meeting of the Board of EBIC, 15 June 1979.
26. SGA, 81484, “Background Analysis,” Annexe 1 to Memorandum on EBIC
Cooperation, 8 July 1980, p.1.
27. For an overview of the international activities of European banks in the
1970s, see Altamura, European Banks.
28. On the history of financial centers, see Cassis, Capitals of Capital.
29. Sargent, “Pressure Group.”
30. BFA, Journal Banque n°372, “Harmonisation des législations bancaires
dans la Communauté Économique Européenne,” Charles Campet, April 1978.
31. Ibid.
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substantial change but had actually been favored by theBBAas away to
prevent another secondary banking crisis.32 The BBA saw it as a means
to prevent access to the banking profession from imprudent “cowboy”
banks.33 The 1979 UK Banking Act would actually go further than the
EC directive, as British banks started to doubt its efficiency.34 Once
enacted, the first banking directive did not trigger much reaction from
bankers, even though they had strongly influenced it, because they
considered it more as a starting point than as a move with concrete
impact.35 The first banking directive indeed called for other directives
in various fields of banking, which would be the story of the 1980s.
Among those projects, the plans for a second general directive comple-
menting the first one emerged quite early.
In January 1980, the assistant secretary of the BBA circulated to
the BBA’s executive committee a discussion paper prepared by the
Inter-Bank Research Organisation (IBRO) on the Commission’s plans
for a commonmarket in banking.36 Themain point of the paper, which
represented the British commercial banking sector’s view, was to won-
der whether harmonization was worth the costs it entailed in terms of
increase in regulation. It stressed that the Commission should focus
more on removing the real obstacles in intracommunity banking, in
particular exchange controls, withholding taxes on bank interest paid
to nonresidents,37 and the obstacles to free banking existing within
each country, such as the privileges granted to specific financial
institutions in the agricultural sector or elsewhere.38 Furthermore, it
stressed that there existed national and structural barriers to banking
integration not directly linked to banking legislation, such as language,
the legal system, taxation, currencies, the ownership of local banks, the
degree of concentration or specialization in banking, and the closeness
of the relationship between local banks and their customers. It further
32. The secondary banking crisis was a crisis affecting financial institutions
(“fringe” banks) which had been booming in the City since the late 1950s, and then
faced liquidity difficultieswhich turned into a crisis of confidence in 1973/1974. See
Capie, The Bank of England, 524–586.
33. Sargent, “Pressure Group,” 274.
34. Sargent, “Pressure Group,” 278.
35. Centre des archives économiques et financières (French Economic and
Financial Archives) (CAEF), 5A 252/1, Annual Report of the European Banking
Federation 1978, p. 3.
36. LMA, BBA documents, M 3227B 5, “A Common Market in Banking in the
European Community. A Discussion Paper,” Inter-Bank Research Organisation,
undated but circulated in January 1980.
37. Tax on interest arising in one country but paid to personswhose residence is
outside this country. This, together with exchange controls, was considered as
forcing banks to open branches in other member states in order to offer services to
local residents.
38. That was particularly the case in France.
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argued that the actual degree of interpenetration was quite limited,
foreign EEC banks totalling less than 2 percent of personal deposits in
France and less than 2 percent of total assets in Germany, a country
where banks from the United States were more numerous than banks
from other EEC countries.39 Even in London, where foreign and EEC
banks were well established, activities were mostly offshore, and IBRO
estimated that foreign EEC banks had not much more than 2 percent
of total sterling bank lending to the UK private sector, way behind
American banks. In this context, the Eurodollar market had played a
role of compensation of a poorly integrated banking and capital market
in the Community. However, IBRO considered it would be difficult to
change the situation in the retail banking area and suggested that the
Commission should focus on other areas. This situation probably
explained why the banking sector was less openly supportive of a
common market in banking, even if it was supportive of European
integration in general, than the industry: In January 1981 the
Confederation of British Industry (CBI) had published a report in
which, despite also urging for a reordering of harmonization priorities,
it expressed its full support to the European Economic Community,
which was the destination of 42 percent of British exports.40 At least in
the British case, the business derived from European activities was
more substantial for the industry than for banking.
InOctober 1981, officials from theDirectorateGeneral (DG)XVof the
Commission, responsible for financial institutions and taxation,
informed the BBA delegates of the Commission’s plans for a second
banking directive.41 DG XV wanted to have banks’ views on what
should be included in such a directive. The BBA delegates considered
that the Commission wanted to issue new regulatory elements in order
to advance its integration agenda. Businesses could thus be a political
resource for gaining legitimacy in this perspective. Returning from a
visit to the Commission in March 1981, a BBA delegate wrote: “The
impression was gained that DG XV were rather searching for tasks in
respect of banking. When it was mentioned that the Federation hoped
to put forward a paper explaining ways in which the banks felt the
Commission might move forward, it was immediately welcomed and
39. LMA, BBA documents, M 3227B 5, “A Common Market in Banking in the
European Community. A Discussion Paper,” Inter-Bank Research Organisation,
undated but circulated in January 1980, p. 3.
40. LMA, BBA documents, M 3227B 5, “Extract from ‘The Impact of
E.E.C. Legislation on British Business’ (C.B.I. Study),” January 1981. On British
business and the European Community, see. Rollings, British Business.
41. LMA,BBAdocuments,M32329/6, “Report of aVisit to the E.C.Commission
and others in Brussels on 12th and 13th October, 1981,” J.M. Evans.
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regarded as particularly relevant at the start of a new Commission.”42
The second banking directive would aim to refine the areas touched by
the first one, in particular, the notion of own funds.43 Indeed, the first
banking directive required banks to have “adequate minimum own
funds” without providing a precise definition of it.44 Also, the project
of the second banking directive would aim at removing the remaining
obstacles to the establishment of representative offices and branches in
othermember states, such as local capital requirements inGermany.On
the occasion of their visit to the Commission, Troberg, Banking Advi-
sory Committee secretary and member of DG XV, told the BBA dele-
gates that he welcomed banks’ views on what else should be
included.45 This invitation from the Commission toward banks to be
more active highlights that the common market in banking was polit-
ically driven. In this perspective, businesses could beused as a resource
to mitigate governments’ objections, a strategy that had long been used
by the Commission.46
In December 1981, the Commission issued a first document, titled
“Plans for a Second Council Directive for Credit Institutions”
(XV/253/81).47 Overall, banks severely criticized the preliminary
proposals for a second banking directive.48 The BBA was not very
enthusiastic about the consultative paper and considered that “harmo-
nisation within the E.E.C. should seek only to eliminate significant
obstacles to integration; harmonisation should not be pursued as an
end in itself and should aim at providing only a minimum level of
regulation.”49 It also added that “some of the Commission’s proposals
appear to represent an unnecessary and undesirable intensification
of the regulatory process.” The EBF was along the same lines.50
The BBA, in particular, criticized the attempt to impose requirements
for branches to have their own capital. However, an internal note
42. LMA, BBA documents, M 32329/6, “Report of a visit by representatives of
the British Bankers’ Association to the E.C. Commission and others in Brussels on
26th and 27th March, 1981,” p. 4.
43. LMA, BBA documents, M 32329/6, “Advisory Committee.”
44. Own funds are the funds kept by the bank in order to conduct business and
absorb losses. The word capital is sometimes used as an equivalent.
45. LMA, BBA documents, M 32329/6, “Advisory Committee.”
46. Historical Archives of the European Union (HAEU), “Interview with Clau-
dio, Segre,” Recorded in 2004, https://archives.eui.eu/en/oral_history/INT734,
accessed 25 January 2020, p. 7.
47. LMA, BBAdocuments,M32020, BriefingNote, “Plans for a SecondCouncil
Directive for Credit Institutions,” January 1984.
48. LMA, BBA documents, M 32329/8, “Brussels visit – Suggested questions,”
undated but related to visit of 20–22 October 1982.
49. LMA, BBA documents, M 32329/7, “Plans for Second Council Directive for
Credit Institutions.”
50. Ibid.
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written in preparation for a visit in October 1982 stated that “the
B.B.A. wholeheartedly supports the Commission's avowed long-term
aim to establish a common market in banking with minimal regulation
by the home country authority.”51 In sum, two different views of the
common market in banking were emerging: that of freedom to operate,
and that of common rules. Although all recognized that liberalization
and harmonization somehow had to go together, the Commission
pushed the second element, and commercial banks preferred the first
one. On the French side, their limited interest in European affairs also
related to different issues than those expressed most vocally by the
BBA: In particular, thewish tomaintain their strong domestic positions
was not triggering much excitement about the advent of a European
common market in banking, but also the shock of the 1982 nationali-
zations made them focus on domestic affairs.52
Even if a diversity of views existed within the Banking Federation,
the EBF gave clear preference to the liberalization of all the aspects of
banking in Europe, from establishing in another country to capital
movements. This was particularly the case of British banks, who con-
sidered their country as less regulated than other EEC countries and did
not wish to see harmonization on the continental level. British banks
perceived harmonization as an attempt to create new regulations. Most
important, the EBF saw harmonization as a threat to the national sys-
tems in place, which banks did not necessarily want to change. The
views of the banking community resembled, to someextent, those of the
industry, in the sense that the Union des Industries de la Communauté
Européenne (UNICE) had also stated harmonization should only be
pursued where there was an identified need for it.53 However, UNICE
recognized the importance of harmonization for the development of the
EEC to a larger extent than the EBF.
Very progressively, the position of the EBF was evolving, however.
In 1981, the European Banking Federation issued a discussion paper
drafted by the BBA and aiming at “a more positive and constructive
approach by the European banking community to the Commission's
activities.”54 The paper, greatly influenced by the 1980 IBRO study
51. LMA, BBA documents, M 32329/8, “Brussels visit – Suggested
questions,” p. 3.
52. Barclays Archives (BA), 0391-0153, “Crédit Lyonnais in Europe,” Central
Planning Department, September 1989, p. 2; HAEU, MID 155, “Interview With Mr
Charles Hammer; European Delegate of the Banque de Paris et des Pays Bas
(Paribas),” 21 January 1993.
53. LMA, BBA documents, M 32329/7, “E.E.C.: Harmonisation of Law,” Back-
ground paper n°23 for the visit to Brussels on 9–11 November 1981.
54. LMA,BBAdocuments,M32329/7, “’Development of theBankingSystem in
the European Community’ Banking Federation Discussion Paper,” Background
paper n°24 for the visit to Brussels on 9–11 November 1981.
12 DRACH
https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/eso.2020.20
Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. IP address: 92.3.124.202, on 24 Aug 2020 at 08:28:55, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at
previously mentioned, stressed that local supervisory requirements
still represented serious barriers to branch opening in a member
state and that absolute harmonization was not a satisfactory solution.
It suggested two particularly important items: first, that central banks
from member states should trust each other enough to authorize the
establishment of branches from foreign banks without any other for-
malities than those existing in the home country; second, that there
should be enough harmonization so that banks from one member state
would not be favored compared to the banks from other member
states.55 The European Banking Federation explicitly prioritized the
reduction of regulation over harmonization, which was to be pursued
only when necessary for the removal of significant obstacles to integra-
tion.National differenceswere to bepreserved. Thepaper listed several
obstacles, the first of whichwere barriers to transborder flows of capital
and income, such as exchange controls.56 The proposal that central
banks recognize each other’s procedures was close to the mutual
recognition principle, which was coming out of the 1979 Cassis de
Dijon case and would later become the integration philosophy of the
Commission, even if a reference to this case has not been found in the
records of that time.
Between 1982 and 1985, the Commission focused on own funds,
which were partially linked to a commonmarket in banking, as harmo-
nization in this area was meant to ensure equal competition, but also
had to do with other concerns such as financial stability. The observa-
tionwork conducted in this area by the BankingAdvisory Committee, a
new EEC expert committee created by the 1977 directive, attracted all
the attention, and its progress was instrumental in any development in
the second banking directive. The topic of own funds was increasingly
under pressure from the work conducted in the same area at the Group
of Ten level at the Bank for International Settlements, within the Basel
Committee on Banking Supervision, which included major players
such as Japan and the United States.57 Little by little, the issue of own
funds became the subject of a directive in itself.
In parallel, the Commission issued in 1983 a document enclosing an
ambitious plan for furthering financial integration in Europe.58 This
document was, here again, not strictly speaking about the common
market in banking but addressed issues related to it, such as the
55. Ibid.
56. Ibid.
57. LMA, BBA documents, M 32329/10, “Report of a visit by Alan Kettley and
Michael Evans to the E.C. Commission and others in Brussels on 12th and 13th April,
1984.”
58. BFA, 1357200901/94, “Intégration financière (Communication de la Com-
mission au Conseil),” 18 April 1983.
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liberalization of capital flows. Overall, the EBF welcomed the paper
and its objectives. The Banking Federation supported the proposals for
examining whether restrictions on capital movements should be
allowed to continue.59 The AFB had been asking for the removal of
exchange controls for a long time and verymuch favored the removal of
capital controls altogether.60 When the paper addressed the harmoni-
zation of banking regulation, the Federation supported the aim of a
gradual emergence of a common market in banking but stressed the
practical difficulties involved. Finally, the EBF argued against the use
of uniform banking ratios such as solvency as a regulatory tool and
disputed the argument that an increased competition would reduce
borrowing costs, stating that international banking was already very
competitive.61 However, for European commercial banks, the Commis-
sion’s ideas were going in the right direction.
From Interest to Enthusiasm
The issuance of the 1985white paper and the following signature of the
Single European Act introduced major changes, as they set a precise
regulatory agenda in the field of banking, even though those plans had
been devised for several years. Shortly before the white paper was
issued, the ambitious plans of the Delors Commission were known
and supported by British banks. In a letter to another member of the
BBA inpreparation of an upcomingmeetingwith the headof theBritish
delegation in Brussels in March 1985, Robin Hutton, from the BBA
executive committee (and a former Commission official), stated that
the BBA should support the political objectives of the Delors
Commission.62 He considered that “the banks should support all efforts
of theCommission to reduce barriers to cross-frontier services business,
no matter whether the immediate beneficiary is insurance, investment
or any other service: all freedom of services directives are valuable
59. LMA,BBAdocuments,M32423, "Comments of the E.C. Banking Federation
on the Communication from the Commission to the Council Concerning ‘Financial
Integration,’” draft, 12 August 1983, p. 2.
60. BFA, 2150200701/38, Annual report of the Association Française des Ban-
ques 1987, p. 31.
61. LMA,BBAdocuments,M32423, "Comments of the E.C. Banking Federation
on the Communication from the Commission to the Council Concerning ‘Financial
Integration,’” draft, 12 August 1983, p. 5.
62. Robin Hutton had been a director of DG XV at the Commission in the 1970s,
and had been a merchant banker before that. He had played an important role in
changing the approach of theCommission to banking between the 1973 directive and
the first banking directive in 1977. The role of British nationals in key positions for
financial matters at the Commission was instrumental in British influence on
European banking regulation. See Josselin, Money Politics. For his role in the
1970s, see Sargent, “Pressure Group.”
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building blocks against national protectionism and towards a common
market in banking and finance.”63 More particularly, Hutton argued
that the future of banking was less about opening branches than about
technological innovations and international electronic operations,
which did not require a physical presence in another country but the
freedom toprovide services from thehomecountry. Therefore, theBBA
welcomed the freedom to provide the services principle encompassed
in the common banking market plans, as well as, more generally, the
new Delors Commission’s reported intention to focus on the internal
market and on service industries. Hutton explained that British banks
had changed their mind about the EEC: “There has been a pretty fun-
damental change in the outlookof theBritish banks over the recent past,
of which Sir Michael should be aware. From a (2) posture basically
negative to EEC initiatives, the BBA has moved towards a more open-
minded approach on such matters as banking legislation, credit infor-
mation exchange, accounting standards, and monetary cohesion.”64
This change of opinion from the British banks resulted from the change
in the international economic environment, marked by the interna-
tional debt situation in many developing countries’ markets and the
securitization of the banking industry. This context induced a sharp
decline in international lending, and made regulatory changes in the
area of securitiesmore important, and therefore the newpolitical impe-
tus given by the Delors Commission more welcome.65 However, the
change of approach by the Commission, from harmonization tomutual
recognition, was also a major reason why banks, who had themselves
called for such a change, becamemore supportive of a commonmarket
in banking. A few days after the white paper came out, Tom Soper,
EEC advisor at Barclays Bank wrote to the deputy chairman, Quinton:
“Lord Cockfield is in the news as he has just issued a Commission
White Paper on a single internal market in the Community. This is
obviously something we shall be discussing with him over lunch on
24th September, 1985.”66 A note was then circulated in August 1985 to
about ten members of staff at the European Economic Community Unit
63. LMA, BBA documents, M 32459, letter from Robin Hutton to R.J. Dent,
“Meeting with Sir Michael Butler,” 7 February 1985.
64. Ibid., 2
65. Both changes (the aftermath of the international debt situation
and securitization in banking) were mentioned in Hutton’s paper: LMA, BBA doc-
uments, M 32459, letter from Robin Hutton to R.J. Dent, “Meeting with Sir Michael
Butler,” 7 February 1985. The impact of the international debt crisis on the decline of
international lending and on securitization was analyzed in the “Cross Report”
edited by the Bank for International Settlements in April 1986: BIS, ‘“Cross Report.”
66. BA, 0717-0180, internal communication from Tom Soper to J.G. Quinton,
19 June 1985, one page document.
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in Barclays to ask for their views on the white paper so that these views
could be transmitted to Tom Soper before his September meeting.67
The banking community welcomed the direction taken by the white
paper. In its comments from November 1985, the EBF welcomed the
white paper and vigorously supported its objectives.68 It pointed out
that most suggestedmeasures were not new but supported the political
impetus of the document. It reaffirmed its preference for liberalization
over harmonization and stressed that liberalization was a necessity for
furthering the integration, while the need for harmonization should not
be exaggerated. Precisely, the white paper claimed that harmonization
should not always be considered as a necessary first step, as was the
case in the past, in particular in the field of banking supervision.69 This
point reflected the Commission’s move away from harmonization
toward mutual recognition, and was very close to the 1981 EBF paper
suggesting that authorities frommember states should trust each other’s
authorization procedures in order to facilitate banks’ establishment in
member states countries. Therefore, this part of the white paper was
particularly welcomed by the EBF.
The white paper contained plans for the removal of exchange con-
trols and liberalization of capital movements, which were not solely
related to the common market in banking as they were much broader
in scope, but which triggered internal discussions at the EBF on the
respective balance of harmonization and liberalization. Overall,
the EBF vigorously supported the liberalization of capital movements.
In June 1986, Robert Pelletier, a former member of the main French
employer organization (Conseil national du patronat français, CNPF)
and secretary general of the Association Française des Etablissements
de Crédit,70 considered the European move as a major change for the
French financial system.71 Although this change was not unwelcome,
as it pushed France to reduce its strict control on banks, Pelletier
regretted that the French tradition of state intervention would penalize
French banks in international competition.72 This explains why not all
bankers agreed on the rhythm and conditions of the planned changes.
During the October 1986 meeting of the EBF, two main opinions were
67. BA, 0717-0180, internal communication fromN.D. Phipps, 21August 1985.
68. BFA, 1357200901/94, “L’achèvement dumarché intérieur: Livre blanc de la
Commission à l’intention du Conseil Européen. Observations de la Fédération Ban-
caire de la Communauté Européenne,” November 1985.
69. Ibid.
70. The Association Française des Établissements de Crédit gathered all credit
sectors associations in France, such as the French Association of Banks, the thrift
institutions, or the Caisse Nationale de Crédit Agricole.
71. BFA, 1357200901/94, “L'intégration financière européenne. Un change-
ment fondamental pour l'appareil financier français,” Robert Pelletier, 27 June 1986.
72. Ibid., 6.
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expressed on the liberalization of capital movements.73 Those coun-
tries (France, Italy, Spain, Ireland, Greece) where controls were still in
place insisted upon a gradual removal of existing regulations on capital
movements, whereas others (UnitedKingdom, Belgium, Germany, Por-
tugal) favored rapid progress, stating that the areas where harmoniza-
tion was necessary were limited.74 A general concern of the EBFwas to
ensure fair competition. Together with the liberalization of capital
movements, the EBF gave priority to the harmonization of taxation,
as the freedom of capital flows was expected to increase international
competition. French banks were particularly keen on stressing the
urgency of this matter but were opposed by British, Luxembourg, and
German banks.75
To some extent, in any case, commercial banks were changing their
minds about the EEC initiatives in the field of banking because these
were gettingmuch closer to their owndemands: liberalization of capital
movements (even though there were different opinions concerning the
rhythm of this liberalization) and mutual recognition of a national reg-
ulatory systemasaway toavoid theharmonizationapproachwhichhad
been that of the Commission until then. An additional difference to the
1970s proposals was the cumulation of many planned directives in
the field of banking and finance: The proposed changes concerned the
liberalization of capital movements, and the freedom to provide ser-
vices, and to establish, banking, insurance, and capital markets opera-
tionsmoreor lessat thesame time.This showed thedeterminationof the
Commission to move forward with the completion of the internal mar-
ket. Given the new support of several member states, and in particular
of the French government, to this ambitious program, commercial
banks could only realize that the political impetus at both EEC and
national level was here and that they could not escape it.76 The strong
support of the government was particularly important for redirecting
French banks’ interest toward Europe. For instance, according to
Barclays’sobservers, theCréditLyonnais’sambitiousEuropeanstrategy
was also a decision of the French Treasury and a substitute to privatiza-
tion.77 Quite logically, because EEC commercial banks had themselves
called forsomeof theproposedchanges, andbecause itwas followingan
international trend toward liberalization, they chose to embrace it.
73. SGA, 81084, European Banking Federation, “Minutes of the 58th Board
meeting (Madrid, 31st October 1986),” 24 November 1986.
74. Ibid.; see also Bakker, The Liberalization of Capital Movements.
75. Josselin, Money Politics, 153.
76. On the role of France in the liberalization of capital movements, see Bakker,
The Liberalization of Capital Movements.
77. BA, 0391-0153, “Crédit Lyonnais in Europe,”Central Planning Department,
September 1989.
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Without the section on own funds, which had become the subject of
specific directives, the second banking directive could focus on the
conditions for opening branches and conducting banking activities
in the Community. The first proposal for a directive was issued in
February 1987.78 It encompassed the change in philosophy from the
Commission, departing from an objective of total harmonization to the
mutual recognition of each other’s regulatory framework, and gave
a prominent role to home authorities in the control of their banks.
The paper proposed some harmonization in the definition of activities
subject to supervision, in authorization procedures for opening a
branch, and for the suppression of a minimum capital requirement
for branches.79
In February 1987, C. J. Oort, the Dutch president of the EBF, intro-
duced the official comments of the EBF on the second banking directive
proposal by saying that it “entirely agree[d] with the main thrust of the
directive.”80 The EBF had become enthusiastic about the plans for a
common market in banking. C. J. Oort stressed a few issues, however,
saying that the implementation of the principles of the white paper
required “a sufficient degree of harmonisation of solvency ratios, and
free access by credit institutions to the same activities in all Member
States.”81 He also stressed that the problems of “approximation of tax
legislation and convergence of economic andmonetary policies”had to
be resolved to prevent distortions of competition. In defining the scope
of activities covered by the proposed directive, the Commission sug-
gested shifting from an institutional to a functional approach, because
of the ongoing changes in banking activities and the blurring of the
distinction between different financial activities such as banking,
insurance, and securities operations. This meant that the directive
would apply to identifiable types of activities instead of specific
institutions.
The banking sector was anxious to preserve its independence
from industry in its negotiation on the second banking directive. When
UNICE set up a financial services working group, which was expected
to express views on various initiatives of the Commission, including
the Second banking directive, it was badly perceived. An internal note
at Société Générale stated that “one can fear that compromises imposed
by the manufacturing sector too much influences the views of this
78. SGA, 81084, “Le contenu de la deuxième directive de coordination
bancaire,” XV/187(86) Rev 1, 9 February 1987.
79. Ibid.
80. SGA, 81084, Letter from C. J. Oort to Lord Cockfield, 21 April 1987, p. 1.
81. Ibid, 2.
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working group.”82 The AFB and the EBF took the view that UNICEwas
legitimate to represent the services industries in the GATT (General
Agreement onTarrifs andTrade) discussions, but could not become the
Commission interlocutor onbankingmatters,whichwere the exclusive
competence of the Banking Federation.83 In general, the banking com-
munity wished to keep some degree of autonomy from other economic
sectors as a way to preserve its bargaining power, especially on techni-
cal matters.
The scope of the directive remained controversial within the
EBF. The BBA had a different view from other national associations.
The latter agreed with the Commission to have a wider definition than
the one of the first banking directive because they wanted to subject
banks’ competitors to equivalent Community regulation. The BBA, on
the other hand, noted that “the advantage of the 1977 definition when
combined with the List of services is that banks will be entitled to
conduct a wide range of business across the EEC whereas their com-
petitors will not.”84 The BBA also had an issue with the list of activities
covered by the directive, as it included types of investment business
such as securities business. Thiswould allowEuropeanbanks to under-
take these activities in the United Kingdom without being authorized
by specific institutions such as the Securities and Investment Board or
the self-regulatory institutions. On the other hand, it would benefit
British banks operating in Europe, and the BBA believed that on
balance, the British banks would gain from this list. However, the
British government was not clear about this issue, to which the BBA
raised attention by a letter to the Bank of England.85
At its October 1987 meeting in Athens, the EBF discussion on the
second banking directive focused on a recent change in the Commis-
sion’s proposal excluding securities business from the list of activities
associated with banking. These activities would, therefore, not be sub-
ject to mutual recognition.86 This move triggered the protest of the EBF
because banks’ securities business was sharply growing at that time,
and regulators were striving to adapt their regulatory framework
82. Translation from author (“Il est à craindre que les avis d’un tel groupe de
travail ne soient trop influencés par les compromis imposés par le secteur manufac-
turier”). SGA, 81084, “Conseil de la Fédération Bancaire. Lisbonne, 15 mai 1987.
Point 8 – Contacts avec d’autres organisations: European Services Group, UNICE,
Table Ronde des Banquiers,” 4 May 1987, p. 1.
83. Ibid.
84. LMA, BBA documents, MS 32423, “Brief for the E.C. Banking Federation
60th BoardMeeting –Athens – 30th October. Briefing note –Agenda item 3 – Second
Banking Coordination Directive,” 1987, one page document.
85. Ibid.
86. Lloyds Banking Group Archives (LBGA), HO/Ch/Mor/154, “Minutes of the
60th Meeting of the Board—Athens, 30th October 1987,” 24 November 1987.
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accordingly, sometimes incoherently. The Federation agreed to press
theCommission,which eventually accepted, to include securities busi-
ness in themutual recognition list, and to appeal to national authorities
to rationalize their attitude in the field.87 It also decided to bring up the
matter with the Basel Committee meeting at the Bank for International
Settlements, because discussions there involved the United States and
Japan and securities business was best managed at the global level.
The main controversial area of the second banking directive con-
cerned a reciprocity clause dealing with the conditions for authoriza-
tion for banks from non-EEC countries. Both the British banks and
government opposed the reciprocity clause, as they feared it would
damage the attractiveness of the City as an international financial cen-
tre. Continental banksweremore supportive and sometimes strongly in
favor of this principle.88 The French banks were particularly favorable
to introducing such a clause in order to obtain leverage over other
countries. They played an important role in convincing the French
authorities to bring thematter to Brussels, in particular through a report
on the question byDeCroisset from the Crédit Commercial de France.89
In April 1987, the AFB circulated a note on the matter to the Board and
Central Committee of the European Banking Federation.90 The French
association stated that the increased competition to be expected from
the 1992 completion of the single market would also occur vis-à-vis
non-EEC countries, and would not concern authorization procedures
only, but banking activities in general. It particularly pointed out the
separation between commercial and investment banking or wealth
management in several non-European countries, whereas continental
Europe often had universal banks. These universal banks often encoun-
tered difficulty in accessing these different types of banking activities.
This was particularly the case in Japan, where many French banks
complained that they faced several obstacles in their commercial bank-
ing activities. In particular, the AFB considered it was extremely diffi-
cult and slow for banks that had a commercial banking license to obtain
an investment banking license as well. The AFB was also concerned
about recent revelations in the press, according to which the Japanese
87. Ibid.
88. HAEU, MID 138, “Interview With Mr Bernard Schneiter: Vice Delegate
General For Community Affairs at the Association Françaises des Banques,”
17 December 1992.
89. BFA, 2150200701/38, Annual report of the Association Française des Ban-
ques 1987.
90. SGA, 81075, Note from Marc Viénot, chairman of Société Générale and of
the International Affairs Commission of the Association Françaises des Banques, to
the Board and Central Committee of the European Banking Federation, 23 April
1987.
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authorities delivered investment banking licenses in Tokyo in strict
accordance to the number of licenses pursued by Japanese banks in
Europe.91 Until then, reciprocity issues had been resolved on the basis
of bilateral agreements, but the AFB believed European banks would
have more leverage if these negotiations were carried out at the
Community level. Finally, the AFB considered that it was time for the
EBF to raise the attention of the Commission to this issue because new
negotiations at the GATT level were starting and were for the first time
including the sector of financial services.92 The access to the European
market by non-EEC banks was thus an important and controversial ele-
ment of the common market in banking in construction.
The reciprocity clause was rigorously opposed by both the British
banks and the British government. During ameeting of the City Liaison
Committee in July 1988, Sir JeremyMorse, president of the BBA and of
Lloyds Bank, stated that “the BBAwere at onewith theUKGovernment
in seeking clear deregulation of markets and in seeking to avoid the
erection of barriers round the “European Community.”93 Sir Nicholas
Goodison, chairman of the International Stock Exchange, agreed
with Morse and “expressed deep concern about the line the European
Commission were taking on the question of reciprocity.”94 The ques-
tion of reciprocity became ahighly political one.At the September 1988
meeting of the central committee of the EBF, the AFB stressed that this
concern was particularly acute in the sense that major Japanese and
American banks were already established in the EEC andwould, there-
fore, benefit from both mutual recognition and freedom to provide
services within the EEC.95 The United Kingdom was the only country
categorically opposed to the reciprocity clause.96 According to a
French banker from the AFB, the battle on that question was resolved
at a very high level.97 Eventually, a flexible approach to reciprocitywas
adopted: Member states’ authorities had to inform the Commission of
authorizations andmajority participation in Community credit institu-
tions granted to non-EEC banks, but no strict limitation was enacted.98
91. Ibid.
92. Ibid.
93. BEA, 6A395/16, “City Liaison Committee Meeting: 6 July 1988,” 8 July
1988, p. 2.
94. Ibid, 3.
95. BNP-Paribas Archives (BNPPA), 2 AH 22, Association Française des
Banques, “Séance du 11 octobre 1988. Point sur les travaux de la Fédération bancaire
de la Communauté Européenne.”
96. HAEU, MID 138, “Interview With Mr Bernard Schneiter: Vice Delegate
General For Community Affairs at the Association Françaises des Banques,”
17 December 1992.
97. Ibid.
98. BFA, Journal Banque n°503, “CEE – Deuxième directive de coordination
bancaire,” Bernard Lhomme, March 1990, p. 319.
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From Enthusiasm to Action
The second banking directivewas eventually issued inDecember 1989,
while several other directives had already been issued or were issued
around the same time. In June 1988, the liberalization of capital flows
had been enacted, and in April and December 1989, the definition and
requirements of banks’ capitalization were harmonized by two direc-
tives. Other directives had been adopted or were being discussed at the
same time in the field of insurance and capital markets, which were
growing areas of activities for banks, too. The main difference with the
first banking directive was that the mutual recognition principle had
practical implications. In addition, this second directive was part of a
set of several directives, which, together, implied serious change for
European banking, whereas the first one had very limited practical
consequences. The commercial banks had therefore been much more
involved in negotiating their details to defend their interests. Combined
with the liberalization of capital flows and common capital adequacy
rules, the second banking directive enabled banks to establish freely in
the Community through the principle of mutual recognition, but also
to freely provide services without having to be physically present in
another country, in a more homogeneous competitive environment.
That was the cornerstone of a commonmarket in banking, even though
this market was far from complete. The objective to implement most of
these directives by 1992 triggered much discussion on the “Horizon
1992.”
However, even if the EBF had become much more supportive of
European efforts in the financial sector, the enthusiasmof French banks
was still partly hindered by the fact they felt threatened by the
advent of the common market in banking: They considered that the
liberalization of capitalmovements or the establishment of harmonized
capital ratios would favor the incursion of foreign banks.99 In an inter-
view given in January 1993, the European delegate of Paribas, Charles
Hammer, declared, “Why would a company protected by a highly reg-
ulatedmarket want to risk the dive into the unknown and the danger of
competition?”100Whatmade them accept the processwas the direction
taken by their own authorities, who had firmly committed to the liber-
alization of capital movements and the opening of financial markets,
together with the opportunities French banks started to see—slowly,
according toHammer—inEuropean integration, and thedesire to benot
99. BA, 0391-0153, “Crédit Lyonnais in Europe,”Central Planning Department,
September 1989, p. 2.
100. HAEU, MID 155, “Interview With Mr Charles Hammer; European Delegate
of the Banque de Paris et des Pays Bas (Paribas),” 21 January 1993, p. 2.
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be seen as lagging behind in international banking. In interviews given
in late 1992 and early 1993, French bankers from AFB, Paribas, and
Crédit Commercial de France all stressed that French bankers had long
distrusted the Commission’s initiatives, had lacked involvement in
European Economic Community matters, or had been slow to react.101
The perspective of a single bankingmarket for 1992 became awidely
debated topic in both France and the United Kingdom, particularly
from 1988 onward. In both countries, banks and authorities expected
increased competition and conducted several studies to examine the
respective strengths andweaknesses of their banking system compared
to those of other member states. In France, the perspective of the single
market in 1992 triggered a sharp surge in banks’ establishment in other
countries from the EEC. As shown in Table 1, by 1989, Europe was by
far the most popular area where French banks had increased their
presence. Thismove reflected the internationalization strategy ofmany
banks, not only in France, often relying on new acquisitions of sub-
sidiaries and mergers.102 Not all credit institutions favored the coming
single market to the same extent, however: The savings banks, in par-
ticular, were wary of excessive competition and of losing their local
links with their clients and their local identity.103 The Savings Banks
Table 1 International expansion of French banks between December 31, 1984,
and December 31, 1988
Europe
(EEC, Switzerland,
Sweden, other)
North America
(USA, Canada,
other)
Asia
(Japan, Singapore, Hong
Kong, other)
1984 1988 1984 1988 1984 1988
Branches 44 57 23 26 46 53
Subsidiaries 83 190 36 59 23 46
Participations 25 36 12 10 7 9
Note: Adapted from BFA, 1749201013/5, “Présence des banques françaises à l’étranger et des banques
étrangères en France,” note from the French Banking Commission, November 27, 1989. Branches:
foreign establishments legally depend from the home institution. Subsidiaries: foreign establishments
legally independent from the home institution. Participations: holdings of capital in a foreign banking
institution.
101. HAEU, MID 155, “Interview With Mr Charles Hammer; European Delegate
of the Banque de Paris et des Pays Bas (Paribas),” 21 January 1993; HAEU, MID
138, “Interview With Mr Bernard Schneiter: Vice Delegate General For Community
Affairs at the Association Françaises des Banques,” 17 December 1992; HAEU, MID
161, “Interview With Mr R de la Serre: Financial Director of Credit Commercial de
France,” 15 January 1993.
102. Ibid.; BA, 0391-0153, “BRI Conference–30th June 1988: ‘EC 1992: The
Changing Face of Banking.’; ‘A UK Bank Planning for the Internal Market,’” speech
by Humphrey Norrington, executive director of overseas operations, Barclays PLC.
103. Crédit Agricole-Crédit Lyonnais Archives (CACLA), 387 AH 176, “Le rap-
port des caisses d’épargne européennes sur les stratégies à adopter à l’horizon de
1993,” La Correspondance Economique, 9 April 1990.
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Group of the EEC, therefore, advocated cooperation as a way to cope
with the 1992 challenges.
In London, the regulatory implications of the 1986 Single European
Act prompted a revival of the City Liaison Committee, a coordination
body chaired by the Bank of England and meant to defend the interests
of the City, which had been on standby for a few years.104 In January
1988, the governor of the Bank of England wrote to the members of the
City Liaison Committee about the implications for the City of the pro-
posals for the completion of the internal market by 1992: “One step
which I believemust be taken very soon is to take detailed soundings of
a large number of City practitioners.”105 The governor reckoned that
much attention had been given recently to domestic issues because of
the “Big Bang” in the financial markets in late 1986.106 However, he
considered that the time had come for a careful examination of the
challenges and opportunities of the completion of the internal market,
and how the City could ensure to maintain and reinforce its status of
international financial center. His remarks pointed to another chal-
lenge for European banking integration in Europe: the competition
between financial centers. If London was by far the leading center in
Europe, France was striving to make Paris supplant or rival London,
and so was Frankfurt.107 However, international financial centers had
to be global, not European, to be competitive. Financial integration in
Europe thus encompassed close links with globalization. In the field of
banking supervision, the Bank of England governor was particularly
worried that Community legislation reflected the legalistic approach of
most continental European countries, as opposed to the more informal
approach of the United Kingdom.108 Still, the participants in the City
Liaison Committee meeting overall supported the renewed activity of
the Commission in the financial sector. Jeremy Morse thought “it was
difficult not to be excited by the sense of movement” and “overall …
saw the creation of the single market as a ‘plus sum’ game.”109 A
questionnaire, circulated to the British banks for the occasion, revealed
different opinions and interests toward the completion of the internal
market, however.110 The report noted that domestic-oriented banks
104. BEA, 6A395/15, “City Liaison Committee: Completion of the Internal
European Market,” 8 January 1988, p. 2.
105. Ibid., 2.
106. The Big Bang was a series of measures taken in 1986 to liberalize the British
financial markets. See for instance: Bellringer and Michie, “Big Bang in the City of
London.”
107. Cassis, Capitals of Capital, 262.
108. BEA, 6A395/15, “Completion of the European Internal Market.”
109. BEA, 6A395/16, “City Liaison Committee Meeting: 6 July 1988,” 8 July
1988, p. 2.
110. BEA, 6A395/15, “City Liaison Committee Questionnaire: Preliminary
Response,” 26 May 1988.
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still had little interest in Europe andhadnot really considered the effect
of mutual recognition on their activities in the United Kingdom. The
British banks were therefore split between those with European plans
and those intending to stay on a UK-based business. This feature was
not specific to the United Kingdom.
The strategic reaction of big commercial banks was the third stage in
their response to the advent of a common market in banking, after
indifference and enthusiasm. If these strategies differed from one bank
to another, by 1987, and even more by 1988, all big banks were taking
measures to adapt to the “Horizon 1992.” The cases of Barclays and
Crédit Lyonnais, who were competing, together with Deutsche Bank,
for the leadership on the European market, can illustrate a few key
elements of big commercial banks’ response to the advent of a common
market in banking. First, archival evidence shows that business oppor-
tunities were not so clearly assured as the Commission wished to see:
Both Barclays and the Crédit Lyonnais identified few areas where
expansion could be pursued.111 The Lyonnais stated that Europe
tended to be already “overbanked,” although both Barclays and the
Lyonnais recognized that internal expansion, that is the development
of the banking network through direct establishment of branches or
creation of wholly owned subsidiaries, was risky and costly because
it faced the local characteristics of markets. Even the Crédit Lyonnais,
which claimed to be the most European of the French banks with the
largest European network, and depended heavily on foreign establish-
ments for its development because of its strong retail banking profile,
reckoned that physical expansion in Europe was difficult and risky.112
Most banks preferred to acquire a participation in a joint venture
with a local partner, a fact confirmed by Umberto Burani, head of
the EBF, in 1992.113 The market for large corporate clients was
already global, while that for small and medium companies was con-
sidered by Barclays as too locally rooted to provide access for foreign
111. CACLA, 387 AH 175, “Les stratégies bancaires en vue dumarché unique de
la Communauté Européenne par Jean-Yves Haberer, Président du Crédit Lyonnais,”
12 October 1990; BA, 0391-0153, “BRI Conference – 30th June 1988. ‘EC 1992: The
Changing Face of Banking.’ Speech: ‘A UK Bank Planning for the Internal Market,’”
speech by Humphrey Norrington, executive director of overseas operations,
Barclays PLC.
112. CACLA, 387 AH 175, “Les stratégies bancaires en vue dumarché unique de
la Communauté Européenne par Jean-Yves Haberer, Président du Crédit Lyonnais,”
12 October 1990; BA, 0391-0153, “Crédit Lyonnais in Europe,” Central Planning
Department, September 1989, p. 5.
113. BFA, Journal Banque, supplement to n°533, “Vers l’harmonisation des
régimes bancaires en Europe,” Umberto Burani, secretary general of the EBF,
December 1992.
British and French Commercial Banks and the Common Market 25
https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/eso.2020.20
Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. IP address: 92.3.124.202, on 24 Aug 2020 at 08:28:55, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at
banks.114 Banks recognized the importance of the coming common
market in banking, but in some precisely identified areas only, depend-
ing on each bank specialization.
Second, both Barclays and the Lyonnais repeatedly stressed the role
of the global level for international strategies. Barclays, in fact, consid-
ered Europe as a platform for global competition.115 In September 1987,
even after the Single European Act, its international committee stated
without any hesitation that “preference for any major merger or acqui-
sition was the United States [over Europe] because of common lan-
guage, the coherence of the U.S. market place and its links with the
Far East.”116 Haberer, head of the Crédit Lyonnais, stated in October
1990 that “no big bank will sacrifice its global and worldwide strategy
for its European strategy.”117 The Lyonnais started considering Europe
as an emerging intermediary level, between national and global
markets in banking.118 Barclays, too, believed Europe had now to
become its home market.119 Third, when big commercial banks
decided to act, they did so well in advance of the 1992 deadline,
and went somewhat faster than the EEC legislative process, through
a sharp surge in participation in joint ventures and in acquisitions
of foreign banks, together with internal restructuration. Barclays
stressed the desirability of creating a distinct European culture and
structure in well-defined areas.120 In 1988, it reorganized the manage-
ment structure of its European operations, separating corporate and
retail banking and appointing new managers.121 In 1990, the Crédit
Lyonnais created a structure managing all the non-French European
114. BA, 0391-0153, “BRI Conference – 30th June 1988. ‘EC 1992: The Changing
Face of Banking.’ Speech: ‘A UK Bank Planning for the Internal Market,’” speech by
Humphrey Norrington, executive director of overseas operations, Barclays PLC.
115. Ibid.; BA 0415-0770, Minutes of the International Committee meeting,
11 September 1987.
116. BA 0415-0770, Minutes of the International Committee meeting,
11 September 1987, unnumbered page.
117. Translation from author (“Aucune grande banque européenne ne sacrifiera
sa stratégie mondiale et globale à sa stratégie européenne”). CACLA, 387 AH
175, “Les stratégies bancaires en vue du marché unique de la Communauté Europé-
enne par Jean-Yves Haberer, Président du Crédit Lyonnais,” 12 October 1990, p. 9.
118. CACLA, 387 AH 175, “Les stratégies bancaires en vue du marché financier
unique au sein de la C.E.E.,” H. Cheynel, 21 February 1990.
119. BA, 0391-0153, “BRI Conference – 30th June 1988. ‘EC 1992: The Changing
Face of Banking.’ Speech: ‘A UK Bank Planning for the Internal Market,’” speech by
Humphrey Norrington, executive director of overseas operations, Barclays PLC.
120. BA, 0391-0153, “Crédit Lyonnais in Europe,”Central planning department,
September 1989.
121. BA, 0391-0153, “Barclays Re-Organises to Meet Challenge of 1992,” News
from Barclays, 28 July 1988.
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activity into a single entity.122 In all cases, banks expected new threats
in their home market and new opportunities in Europe, but in a highly
competitive context.
Bankingclubs’ restructuringwasanother responseofbigcommercial
banks to the expected changes of the “Horizon 1992,” even if most of
them eventually did not survive the post-1992 era. In 1989, Commerz-
bank, member of Europartners together with the Crédit Lyonnais, the
Banco di Roma, and the Banco Hispano Americano, circulated to its
partner banks a report entitled “The Europartners: Developing a Joint
Strategy for the Single European Market.”123 In this report, Commerz-
bank viewed Europartners as a useful structure for facing challenges to
come, such as offering Pan-European financial know-how covering the
entire European Economic Community, and increasing competition
between banks but also between near-banks and nonbanks. In 1991,
the Crédit Lyonnais initiated discussions with Commerzbank for
exchanging shares,which represented for theLyonnais auniquechance
to penetrate the German market, which was difficult to access.124 The
completion of the common market in banking also triggered renewed
dynamism at EBIC, which gathered the Société Générale, Midland
Bank, and Deutsche Bank, among others. In 1987, they issued a
“Restatement of Direction” in which they welcomed and supported
progress in the realization of a “free European financial market by
1992,” and suggested restructuring their club.125 In 1989, they issued
a “Draft of a European ‘Doctrine’” in which they stressed the
role of their club in fostering the technical progress of European
banking and mentioned its various initiatives such as a common
banking database, a Euro-netting project developed with ABECOR
(Associated Banks of Europe Corporation, the club of Barclays, BNP,
and others), and a proposed Market Data Exchange.126
The forthcoming common market in banking was not complete,
however, a feature that bankers did not fail to notice. In December
1992, Umberto Burani, secretary general of the European Banking
Federation, published in the journal of the AFB, Banque, a paper in
which he expressed a balanced view on the new European banking
122. CACLA, 387 AH 175, “Les stratégies bancaires en vue du marché financier
unique au sein de la C.E.E.,” H. Cheynel, 21 February 1990.
123. CACLA, 387 AH 65 68, “The Europartners: developing a joint strategy for
the Single European Market,” January 1989.
124. CACLA, 387AH 65 68, “Une avancée déterminante en Europe à saisir par le
Crédit Lyonnais.”
125. SGA, 81484, “Restatement of Direction for EBIC,” November 1987, p. 2.
126. SGA, 81484, “Draft of a European Doctrine,” undated but circulated within
EBIC in February 1989.
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environment.127 He argued that national interests were to play an
essential role in this common market in banking for a long time. First,
because even though no limit to foreign banks’ establishment or partic-
ipationwas expressed in the second banking directive, he could hardly
see how a country would let its entire banking system be controlled by
foreign institutions. In France, he further argued, authorities had lim-
ited foreign acquisitions in the wake of the privatization of banks in the
late 1980s, and the Commission had not complained. Second, he con-
sidered that direct establishment was a costly and challenging exercise
for a bank, which had to adapt to local habits. Therefore, banks tended
to prefer to operate through merger and acquisition of existing banks.
Third, disparities would subsist in the common market in banking
because rules in the EuropeanUnion just set aminimum level,meaning
that a member state could still enact stricter measures. As a conse-
quence, national banking supervisorswould have considerable respon-
sibilities in ensuring that their banks enjoyed comparable competitive
conditions with their European competitors. Indirectly, Umberto
Burani was pointing to the national champions issue in the EU, which
ran counter to the principle of a common market in banking.
Conclusion
This article showed that, contrary towhat is sometimes suggested in the
literature, businesses were not necessarily key drivers of integration. In
the case of the commonmarket in banking, banks took time to embrace
the idea and kept a balanced enthusiasm toward the project. In addi-
tion, the British and French banking sectors mainly supported the
liberalization part of the common market in banking program. Their
position suggests that the common market in banking was primarily
political, for at least three reasons. First, banks did not ask for it, they
hadmore a reactive than a proactive position in thismatter, even if they
were actually influential in the process, both at the request of the
Commission and at their own initiative. Second, the big change came
with the ambitious program set out by the white paper and the ensuing
Single European Act, in which political actors like Delors, Cockfield,
and member states governments played a key role in unlocking the
financial integration of Europe with numerous directives. Third, banks
were actually skeptical about the possibility of ever having a true com-
mon market in banking in Europe, given the differences in financial
127. BFA, Journal Banque, supplement to n°533, “Vers l’harmonisation des
régimes bancaires en Europe,” Umberto Burani, secretary general of the EBF,
December 1992.
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systems and the difficulty to penetrate local business. In some cases,
such as the harmonization dimension, the BBA in particular was
fiercely opposed to the integration program of the Commission.
However, the BBA, the EBF, and the big French banks changed their
minds on the European integration process for a variety of reasons.
First of all, Europe largely aligned on their demands, such as liberali-
zation of capital flows and mutual recognition. Furthermore, the
cumulation of many directives in the financial sector made clear
both the political determination of the Commission and of member
states, and the actual change that the European process would
bring. In addition, several banks realized that European integration
could bring opportunities, such as an easier access to new member
states’ markets, like Greece, Spain, or Portugal. French banks consid-
ered that European integration deserved support because it could help
defend European interests, for instance on reciprocity issues, even if
their initiative in this field mostly failed. Part of the change of position
toward Europe was also circumstantial: The 1970s international credit
boom had turned international banks away from Europe, but the early
1980s international debt crisis and its aftermath, together with the
securitization trend in banking, brought themback to the old continent.
Finally, the regulatory changes happening at the national and global
level made some initial resistance vanish, in particular in the field of
harmonization of capital ratios, which were being requested by the
United States. A major change in the regulatory environment was
accepted, as it was progressively recognized as both inescapable and
desirable.
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